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Eyewitness Identification
Gary L. Wells*
Mistaken eyewitness-identification testimony is at the heart of a 
large share of the convictions of people whose innocence was later 
proven using forensic DNA testing. A considerable amount is now 
known about how to lower the rate of mistaken identifications 
through the use of better procedures for conducting identification. 
Several procedural reforms are described, such as double-blind 
lineups and pristine assessments of eyewitness-identification 
confidence. Although numerous jurisdictions have made 
improvements to their identification procedures in recent years, a 
large share of jurisdictions have still not made significant reforms. 
Although some courts have been making better use of the scientific 
findings on eyewitness identification, most courts are still using 
an approach that is largely unsupported by scientific findings. 
INTRODUCTION
Mistaken eyewitness identification is a primary cause of the conviction of 
innocent people. At the same time, eyewitness identification is an important and 
necessary tool for convicting criminal perpetrators. Problems with eyewitness-
identification evidence exist at two levels: (1) the collection and preservation 
of eyewitness-identification evidence at the level of the investigation by law 
enforcement and (2) the interpretation and use of eyewitness-identification 
evidence in court. At the level of the investigation, it is important to recognize 
that the methods used to collect and preserve eyewitness-identification evidence 
can themselves be highly unreliable. In general, the reliability of the results 
from a procedure, such as an eyewitness lineup, cannot be any better than 
the reliability of the procedures themselves. Accordingly, these identification 
procedures, which are mainly in the hands of police investigators, need to 
better conform to pristine protocols that are supported by scientific studies 
and best practices. This includes issues of when to conduct identification 
procedures, how to construct fair lineups, using proper pre-lineup instructions 
to witnesses, using double-blind and blinded procedures, securing witness 
statements of certainty at the time of the identification, and video-recording 
of identification procedures. Numerous jurisdictions in the U.S. now serve as 
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models for these procedural reforms. In some jurisdictions, reforms have been 
totally voluntary and even initiated by police agencies themselves. In other 
jurisdictions, reforms have come about only through legislation or pressure 
from courts. A large share of jurisdictions in the U.S. have not yet made 
reforms. In addition, significant resources need to be directed at solutions to 
the problem of the use of showups, which are highly suggestive one-on-one 
identification procedures that, by their very nature, tend to have a high risk of 
mistaken identification. Technological solutions to the showup problem (rapid 
tablet-based photo lineups in the field) are now theoretically viable but require 
new resource allocations to refine and support such applications. 
The second level at which eyewitness identification is a problem in the legal 
system concerns how such evidence is used in the courtroom. Courts need to 
take seriously the task of educating jurors on how to better evaluate eyewitness-
identification evidence and courts need to play a stronger role in preventing 
questionable eyewitness-identification evidence from being admitted in 
the first place. Concrete progress at the courtroom level of the eyewitness-
identification problem can benefit from discarding the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
two-pronged test, as articulated four decades ago in Manson v. Brathwaite,1 an 
approach that dominates how state and federal courts make determinations of 
admissibility in eyewitness-identification cases. The problem with the Manson 
approach is that it makes the assumption that self-reports by eyewitnesses 
of “reliability factors” (e.g., their certainty, how much attention paid during 
witnessing, etc.) are independent of suggestive identification procedures. But 
this assumption has been scientifically discredited.
I. HOW DO WE KNOW THERE IS AN EYEWITNESS- 
IDENTIFICATION PROBLEM?
In 1967, Justice William Brennan wrote that “the vagaries of eyewitness 
identification are well known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances 
of mistaken identification.”2 This was an interesting statement at the time, 
given that Brennan was able to cite very little evidence to back up his claim.3 
Today, we know much more about mistaken eyewitness identification and 
we know it from three sources. First, the advent of forensic DNA testing in 
the 1990s has resulted in the exoneration of 349 people in the U.S. who were 
1. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
2. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967).
3. Brennan’s citations on this point were mostly confined to two books of case studies: 
EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1932), and 
JEROME FRANK & BARBARA FRANK, NOT GUILTY (1957).
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convicted of crimes that they did not commit.4 Approximately 70% of these 
DNA exonerations are cases that involved mistaken eyewitness identification, 
often by multiple witnesses. A second source of evidence that eyewitness-
identification evidence can be problematic is the now large body of scientific 
experiments using simulated crimes.5 These experiments show that mistaken 
eyewitness identification can occur at high rates under certain conditions 
and these experiments have managed to isolate a large number of factors that 
inflate the chances of mistaken eyewitness identification and false confidence 
by eyewitnesses. The third source of evidence that eyewitness identification is 
a problem comes from field studies (both archival and prospective) that have 
examined the outcomes of police lineups in ongoing criminal investigations.6 
These field studies of eyewitnesses from actual cases show that eyewitnesses 
identify known-innocent lineup “fillers” at surprisingly high rates. 
A. THE DNA EXONERATIONS
Although experiments describing problems with eyewitness identification 
were becoming prevalent in scientific psychology journals by the 1970s, 
it was not until forensic DNA testing began to uncover cases of mistaken 
identification in the 1990s that the legal system began taking seriously the 
extent of the problem. In 1997, U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno took careful 
notice of the fact that a new tool in criminal evidence, forensic DNA testing, was 
overturning convictions and that most of these exonerations involved mistaken 
eyewitness identification. Reno directed the National Institute of Justice to 
convene a working group of eyewitness researchers, prosecutors, police, and 
defense attorneys to prepare a guide for law enforcement on the collection 
4. Cases, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/all-cases/#exonerated-by-
dna. For a discussion of wrongful convictions, see Brandon L. Garrett, “Actual Innocence and 
Wrongful Convictions,” in Volume 3 of the present Report. See also Richard A. Leo, “Interrogation 
and Confessions,” in the present Volume (discussing wrongful convictions as a result of false 
confessions).
5. See, e.g., 2 THE HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS PSYCHOLOGY: MEMORY FOR PEOPLE (Rod C. L. 
Lindsay et al. eds., 1st ed. 2007).
6. See, e.g., Ruth Horry et al., Archival Analyses of Eyewitness Identification Test Outcomes: 
What Can They Tell Us About Eyewitness Memory?, 38 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 94, 98–108 (2014); 
Gary L. Wells, Nancy K. Steblay & Jennifer E. Dysart, Double-Blind Photo Lineups Using Actual 
Eyewitnesses: An Experimental Test of a Sequential Versus Simultaneous Lineup Procedure, 39 LAW 
& HUM. BEHAV. 1 (2015).
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and preservation of eyewitness evidence, which was published in 1999.7 This 
was the first time that a high-ranking official in the law enforcement and 
prosecution realm took up the cause of exploring the extent of the eyewitness-
identification problem and what might be done about it. Notice that this was 30 
years after Justice Brennan said that the “vagaries of eyewitness identification 
are well known.” But, in fact, the vagaries of eyewitness identification were not 
well known. Instead, the prominent role of mistaken eyewitness identification 
revealed vividly by the DNA exoneration cases seemed to take judges, 
prosecutors, police, and the general public by surprise. 
Some continue to be dismissive of the DNA exonerations by noting that 245 
or so DNA-based exonerations in eyewitness identification cases is a relatively 
small number given the large number of convictions that occur each year in 
the U.S. But, that is a misunderstanding of what these DNA-exoneration cases 
represent. The DNA-exoneration cases can be only a very small slice of the 
wrongful convictions based on mistaken eyewitness identification. The vast 
majority of wrongful convictions based on mistaken eyewitness identification 
are undiscovered and undiscoverable for several reasons. First, those who have 
been exonerated with DNA testing are a “lucky” small minority for whom the 
biological evidence was properly collected, properly preserved, not destroyed 
or lost after conviction, and did not deteriorate. In other words, even though 
there was no anticipation of the advent of forensic DNA testing, the biological 
evidence was preserved after the conviction for only a subset of cases and only 
in some jurisdictions. Second, it should be noted that DNA-exoneration cases 
are almost exclusively cases that involved sexual assault. It is not the case that 
sexual-assault witnesses are poor eyewitnesses. Instead, the reason that almost 
all DNA-proven mistaken identifications are cases of sexual assault is because 
very few other crimes leave behind DNA-rich biological trace evidence that 
could provide definitive exculpatory evidence for someone who was convicted 
based on mistaken identification. In fact, DNA evidence is extremely rare for 
most eyewitness-identification cases (e.g., robberies, shootings), which means 
 
7. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT (1999), https://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/178240.pdf. This Guide was mailed to every law enforcement agency 
in the U.S. in 1999. The Guide described proper pre-lineup instructions, minimal numbers of 
lineup fillers, how to select lineup fillers, the need to secure a confidence statement from the 
witness at the time of an identification, and the preserving of clear records, among other things. 
However, the Guide did not call for double-blind administration, which eyewitness identification 
experts today consider an essential component of a proper eyewitness identification procedure. 
Also, the 1999 Guide had no force of law behind it. Jurisdictions across the U.S. were free to 
ignore it, and most did. 
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that very few convictions of innocent people based on mistaken eyewitness-
identification evidence can ever be definitively overturned and thereby remain 
hidden injustices.
B. CONTROLLED EXPERIMENTS ON EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION
Since the mid-1970s, an extensive published literature has emerged on 
eyewitness identification that uses experimental methods.8 The primary feature 
of this scientific literature is that the researchers create events, usually simulated 
crimes, for unsuspecting people, thereby making them eyewitnesses. Because 
the researchers created the event, there is no question about what constitutes 
ground truth. In other words, the researchers know exactly what happened 
in the event, including who the “culprit” was. Hence, when the participant-
witnesses are later shown a lineup, the researchers are able to know whether 
the witness made the correct decision (identified the culprit or rejected the 
lineup if the culprit was not present) or an incorrect decision (identified an 
innocent person or rejected the lineup even though the culprit was present). 
This methodology permits the researchers to systematically manipulate 
variables (e.g., view, presence/absence of the culprit in the lineup) to see 
how these variables impact the chances of accurate and mistaken eyewitness 
identifications.
Early in the development of programmatic science on eyewitness 
identification, a distinction was drawn between two types of variables that 
affect eyewitness identification. System variables are those that affect the 
reliability of eyewitness identification over which the justice system has (or 
could have) control; whereas estimator variables are those that affect eyewitness-
identification reliability but the justice system can only estimate that influence 
after the fact rather than control it.9 Examples of system variables include pre-
lineup instructions to witnesses,10 suggestive comments/behaviors by lineup 
8. See, e.g., Gary L. Wells, Amina Memon & Steven D. Penrod, Eyewitness Evidence: 
Improving Its Probative Value, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 45 (2006); Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth F. 
Loftus, Eyewitness Memory for People and Events, in 25 HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY 617 (Irving 
B. Weiner & Randy K. Otto eds., 2nd ed. 2013).
9. Gary L. Wells, Applied Eyewitness-Testimony Research: System Variables and Estimator 
Variables, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1546 (1978).
10. Pre-lineup instructions should warn the eyewitness that the culprit might not be in the 
lineup and witnesses should be given an explicit opportunity to not identify anyone. Failure 
to include such an instruction increases the chances that an eyewitness will identify someone 
even when the culprit is not in the lineup. See Roy S. Malpass & Patricia G. Devine, Eyewitness 
Identification: Lineup Instructions and the Absence of the Offender, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 482 
(1981).
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administrators,11 and characteristics of fillers used in lineups.12 Examples of 
estimator variables include whether or not the witness and the culprit are 
the same race,13 the view that the witness had of the culprit at the time of the 
crime,14 and stress or fear during witnessing.15 Both system and estimator 
variables affect the reliability of an identification. Hence, both system and 
estimator variables are relevant to the court. However, system variables have 
tended to receive more attention, both from researchers and from the justice 
system, because of the potential to use system variables intelligently in ways 
that help prevent mistaken identifications from occurring in the first place. 
In effect, system variables in eyewitness identification generally refer 
to protocols that are used in the collection and preservation of eyewitness-
identification evidence. A critical contribution of controlled experiments on 
eyewitness identification is that these experiments have vividly shown that 
mistaken-identification rates and false confidence can inflate dramatically from 
the use of biased lineups and suggestive procedures, both of which are system 
variables. False confidence refers to an eyewitness who is positive (certain, 
highly confident) and yet mistaken. In the DNA-exoneration cases, mentioned 
in the previous section, nearly every eyewitness expressed high confidence at 
trial that they had identified the actual perpetrator, but they were mistaken 
and, hence, were actually cases of false confidence.
11. The lineup administrator should be someone who does not know which lineup 
member is the suspect and which are fillers. Using a “blind” lineup administrator can prevent 
the administrator from inadvertently steering the witness or providing confirming feedback 
regarding their pick. See Sarah Greathouse & Margaret Bull Kovera, Instruction Bias and Lineup 
Presentation Moderate the Effects of Administrator Knowledge on Eyewitness Identification, 33 LAW 
& HUM. BEHAV. 70 (2009). 
12. The use of known-innocent fillers in the lineup who fit the description of the culprit is 
an essential component of a proper identification procedure. See Gary L. Wells, Sheila M. Rydell 
& Eric P. Seelau, The Selection of Distractors for Eyewitness Lineups, 78 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 835 
(1993).
13. The ability of people to identify someone of their own race is considerably higher than 
their ability to identify someone of another race. See Christian A. Meissner & John C. Brigham, 
Thirty Years of Investigating the Own-Race Bias in Memory for Faces: A Meta-Analytic Review, 7 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 35 (2001).
14. Long distances, for example, severely impair the ability to recognize faces. See Geoffrey 
R. Loftus & Erin M. Harley, Why is it Easier to Identify Someone Close than Far Away?, 12 
PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 43 (2005). 
15. See, e.g., Charles A. Morgan III et al., Accuracy of Eyewitness Memory for Persons 
Encountered During Exposure to Highly Intense Stress, 27 INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 265 (2004).
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It is not the purpose of this article to give an in-depth review of the scientific 
experiments on eyewitness identification. But it is useful to briefly describe 
a few core examples that go to the heart of the issue and here I single out 
three, namely: (1) the biased lineup, (2) confirming feedback, and (3) the mere 
absence of the culprit.
Biased lineup. The classic biased lineup is one in which the suspect, who 
might or might not be the culprit, stands out from the others in the lineup for 
any number of reasons. For example, the eyewitness might have described the 
culprit as a clean-shaven white male in his mid-20s of medium height with 
short, dark hair. Suppose the suspect fits that description but the fillers (non-
suspects who are merely in the lineup to “fill it out”) do not because they have 
curly hair, or are not clean-shaven, or are in their 30s, or have light colored 
hair. Research experiments consistently show that eyewitnesses will identify an 
innocent person who fits that description if the other members of the lineup 
do not. In other words, to be at risk of mistaken identification, a person does 
not have to highly resemble the culprit; the person needs only to look more like 
the culprit than the remaining members of the lineup. 
Confirming feedback. The research literature is now quite clear about the fact 
that, except in rare cases (e.g., coincidental resemblance), eyewitnesses who 
identify an innocent person from a fair lineup tend to not be very confident 
at the time that they make the identification. In other words, false confidence 
tends to not be present at the time of the identification but instead develops 
later, usually after the eyewitness is given some type of confirming feedback. 
A large body of research experiments shows that a simple confirmatory 
comment (e.g., “good, you identified the suspect”) following from a mistaken 
identification serves to dramatically inflate the confidence of the eyewitness 
and lead the eyewitness to believe that she or he was highly confident all along. 
In other words, post-identification confirmations serve to purge eyewitnesses 
of any memory that they were uncertain at the time of their identification. 
Moreover, confirmatory post-identification feedback to eyewitnesses not only 
inflates their recollections of confidence, but also inflates their recollections 
about how good their view was during the crime and how much attention they 
paid to the culprit’s face.16 In fact, this appears to be a major factor leading to 
convictions of innocent people in the DNA-exoneration cases. An analysis of 
the first 250 DNA-exoneration cases, for example, showed that even though all 
 
 
16. See Gary L. Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, “Good, You Identified the Suspect”: Feedback to 
Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports of the Witnessing Experience, 83 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 360 (1998).
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of the eyewitnesses who mistakenly identified the defendants were positive at 
trial, almost all of these eyewitnesses showed evidence that they were in fact 
uncertain at the time of their identifications.17 
Researchers have devised protocol solutions to the problem of confidence 
inflation: use a double-blind lineup administrator (who does not know which 
lineup member is the suspect), secure an explicit statement from the eyewitness 
at the time of the identification as to his or her confidence, videotape the 
identification and confidence statement, and ensure that courts use only the 
original confidence statement (not an inflated one that occurs later).18 
Double-blind lineup administration is probably the most important single 
reform that a jurisdiction can make to its eyewitness-identification procedures. 
Double-blind lineup procedures solve three extremely important problems in 
the collection and preservation of eyewitness-identification evidence from 
photographic and live lineups. First, because the lineup administrator (and 
anyone else present during the lineup) does not know which lineup member 
is the suspect and which are mere fillers, the lineup administrator cannot 
intentionally or unintentionally cue the witness toward the suspect. Second, 
because the lineup administrator does not know which lineup member is the 
suspect and which are mere fillers, the lineup administrator would not be in 
a position to intentionally or unintentionally provide confirming feedback 
to the eyewitness (e.g., “good, you identified the person we suspected”). 
After all, a double-blind administrator cannot be sure whether the witness 
possibly picked a filler. Third, double-blind lineup procedures help ensure 
that the lineup administrator will make a clear and accurate record of the 
eyewitness’s identification decision. Studies of non-blind photo lineups show 
that case detectives tend to not make records of filler identifications but they 
always make a record if the witness identifies the suspect.19 But if a double-
blind administrator is the one who has to make a record of the eyewitness’s 
decision, filler identifications would be recorded as faithfully as identifications 
of a suspect, because the lineup administrator would not know the status of the 
identified person. 
17. BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 
GO WRONG (2012).
18. Nancy K. Steblay, Gary L. Wells & Amy Bradfield Douglass, The Eyewitness Post 
Identification Feedback Effect 15 Years Later: Theoretical and Policy Implications, 20 PSYCHOL. PUB. 
POL’Y & L. 1 (2014).
19. See, e.g., Bruce W. Behrman & Sherrie L. Davey, Eyewitness Identification in Actual 
Criminal Cases: An Archival Analysis, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 475 (2001).
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The absence of the culprit. After all these years of experiments on eyewitness 
identification, it is quite clear that nothing increases the chances of mistaken 
identification more than the mere absence of the culprit from the lineup.20 
As far as we have been able to tell, all of the mistaken identifications in the 
DNA-exoneration cases were instances in which the eyewitness viewed an 
identification procedure in which the actual culprit was not present.21 This 
was not a surprise to eyewitness-identification researchers. As early as 1980, 
eyewitness-identification researchers using controlled experiments were 
observing that eyewitnesses have great difficulty recognizing the absence of the 
culprit even when warned that the actual culprit might not be in the lineup. 
As a result, eyewitnesses have a propensity to make affirmative identification 
decisions even when the culprit is not present in the lineup. This means that 
there is inherent risk to an innocent suspect from being placed in an eyewitness-
identification procedure. The implications of this are immense. Currently, 
there appear to be no jurisdictions in the U.S. for which there is a standard 
(e.g., reasonable suspicion) that should be met in order to put an individual’s 
photo into a photo lineup to see if an eyewitness will identify that person. In 
fact, a field study of lineups conducted in actual cases showed that 40% of the 
time there was no evidence at all against the person and an additional 30% 
of the time there was only minimal evidence.22 Similarly, in a national survey 
of U.S. law enforcement, more than one-third of investigators indicated that 
they needed no evidence at all to put someone in a lineup in order to try to get 
an identification.23 More recently, John Wixted and his colleagues examined 
lineups conducted by a large U.S. police department and derived an estimate 
that the culprit was present in those lineups only 35% of the time.24 Using 
Bayesian statistical methods, researchers have shown that any jurisdiction that 
20. Gary L. Wells, What Do We Know About Eyewitness Identification?, 48 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 
553 (1993).
21. One seeming exception is the case of John Jerome White. In this case the victim-
eyewitness viewed a live lineup in which White was the suspect and White was placed in position 
#3. Unbeknownst to the police, the “filler” who they placed in position 6 of the lineup was 
the actual culprit. Although the culprit was present, the eyewitness nevertheless identified the 
innocent suspect. The victim-witness, however, had already identified White from a photo-
lineup. Hence, the original mistake occurred under conditions in which the actual culprit was 
not in the identification procedure.
22. Bruce W. Behrman & Regina E. Richards, Suspect/Foil Identification in Actual Crimes and 
in the Laboratory: A Reality Monitoring Analysis, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 279 (2005).
23. Richard A. Wise, Martin A. Safer & Christina M. Maro, What U.S. Law Enforcement 
Officers Know and Believe About Eyewitness Factors, Eyewitness Interviews and Identification 
Procedures, 25 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 488 (2011). 
24. John T. Wixted et al., Estimating the Reliability of Eyewitness Identifications From Police 
Lineups, 113 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 304 (2016).
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has a low base rate for the presence of the culprit in its lineups is risking a high 
rate of mistaken identifications.25 In the eyewitness-identification area, this is 
known as the base-rate problem. I have called for some kind of standard, such 
as reasonable suspicion, before placing a possible suspect into the jeopardy of 
an eyewitness-identification procedure.26 
C. IDENTIFICATIONS OF KNOWN-INNOCENT  
FILLERS IN FIELD STUDIES
The third line of evidence that there is a problem with eyewitness-
identification evidence comes from published field studies using data from 
lineups conducted by police. There are now 11 published studies that used 
either an archival method (going back through police files) or a prospective 
method (setting up a procedure to track lineups as they are conducted) to 
collect data on the outcomes of the lineups.27 When properly constructed, a 
lineup contains only one possible suspect and the remaining members are 
known-innocent fillers. In these actual cases, when an eyewitness identifies 
the suspect, we cannot be positive that the suspect is guilty. However, when 
the eyewitness identifies a filler, we know that the eyewitness made a mistaken 
identification. Hence, the rate of filler identifications gives us some sense of 
how often eyewitnesses make mistaken identifications. 
Aggregate data from these 11 published studies appear in the last two lines 
of Table 1. As Table 1 shows, among the 6,734 attempts by eyewitnesses to 
identify the perpetrator from a lineup, 2,746 (40.8%) identified the suspect, 
1,599 (23.7%) identified a known-innocent filler, and 2,389 (35.5%) identified 
no one. Of course, as Table 1 shows, there is variation around these estimates 
25. Gary L. Wells, Yueran Yang & Laura Smalarz, Eyewitness Identification: Bayesian 
Information Gain, Base-Rate Effect-Equivalency Curves, and Reasonable Suspicion, 39 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 99 (2015).
26. See Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification: Systemic Reforms, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 615 
(2006); Wells, Yang & Smalarz, supra note 24.
27. Behrman & Davey, supra note 18; Behrman & Richards, supra note 21; Horry et al., supra 
note 5; Ruth Horry et al., Predictors of Eyewitness Identification Decisions From Video Lineups in 
England: A Field Study, 36 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 257 (2012); Amy Klobuchar, Nancy K. Mehrkens 
Steblay & Hilary Lindell Caligiuri, Improving Eyewitness Identifications: Hennepin County’s 
Blind Sequential Lineup Pilot Project, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 381 (2006); Amina 
Memon et al., A Field Evaluation of the VIPER System: A New Technique for Eliciting Eyewitness 
Evidence, 17 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 711 (2011); Tim Valentine, Alan Pickering & Stephen Darling, 
Characteristics of Eyewitness Identification that Predict the Outcome of Real Lineups, 17 APPLIED 
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 969 (2003); Wells, Steblay & Dysart, supra note 5; Wixted et al., supra note 
23; Daniel B. Wright & Anne T. McDaid, Comparing System and Estimator Variables Using Data 
From Real Lineups, 10 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 75 (1996); Daniel B. Wright & Elin M. 
Skagerberg, Post-Identification Feedback Affects Real Eyewitnesses, 18 PSYCHOL. SCI. 172 (2007).
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from sample to sample. Hence, the best estimate of how often to expect suspect 
identifications, filler identifications, and no identifications from lineups should 
be based on the stable aggregate data shown in Table 1. For purposes of the 
current chapter, there are two figures that stand out. First, nearly one out of 
every four eyewitnesses (23.7%) identified a known-innocent filler. Second, 
if we restrict our estimate of error to only those who made an identification 
(35.5% made no identification), then we see that 36.8% of the witnesses who 
made an identification picked an innocent filler. We do not know how many of 
the identifications of the suspect were also mistaken identifications. 
Table 1. Outcomes from 6,734 attempts by eyewitnesses  
to identify perpetrators from lineups in actual cases across  
the 11 peer-reviewed published studies. 
The frequency with which witnesses identified fillers in these field studies 
raises the question of whether these eyewitnesses were properly instructed with 
the warning that the actual culprit might not be in the lineup and whether 
Eyewitness Identification
Authors
No. of 
possible 
IDs
IDs of 
suspects
IDs of 
fillers
Rejections  
(No ID) suspect% filler% no pick%
choosers
%
Suspect 
rate 
among 
choosers
Filler 
rate 
among 
choosers
Behrman & 
Davey (2001) 58 29 14 15 50.0% 24.1% 25.9% 74.1% 67.4% 32.6%
Behrman & 
Richards (2005) 461 238 68 155 51.6% 14.8% 33.6% 66.4% 77.8% 22.2%
Horry, Halford, 
& Brewer (2014)
833 382 149 302 45.9% 17.9% 36.3% 63.7% 71.9% 28.1%
Horry, Memon, 
& Wright (2012) 1039 406 273 360 39.1% 26.3% 34.6% 65.4% 59.8% 40.2%
Klobuchar & 
Steblay (2006) 178 63 20 95 35.4% 11.2% 53.4% 46.6% 75.9% 24.1%
Memon & 
Havard (2011) 1044 456 437 151 43.7% 41.9% 14.5% 85.5% 51.1% 48.9%
Valentine & 
Pickering (2003)
584 237 121 226 40.6% 20.7% 38.7% 61.3% 66.2% 33.8%
Wixted, Mickes, 
Dunn, Clark, & 
Wells (2016) 348 114 104 130 32.8% 29.9% 37.4% 62.6% 52.3% 47.7%
Wells, Steblay, 
& Dysart (2014) 494 132 75 287 26.7% 15.2% 58.1% 41.9% 63.8% 36.2%
Wright & 
Skagerburg 
(2007) 134 78 28 28 58.2% 20.9% 20.9% 79.1% 73.6% 26.4%
Wright & 
McDaid (1996) 1561 611 310 640 39.1% 19.9% 41.0% 59.0% 66.3% 33.7%
Overall Sum 6734 2746 1599 2389
Weighted means 40.8% 23.7% 35.5% 64.5% 63.2% 36.8%
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they understood that they were free to make no identification. For most of 
these field studies, we cannot be certain how they were instructed. Lineup 
administrators might say that they gave this instruction, but we cannot be 
positive that was the case. But, for one of the field studies,28 we know exactly 
how witnesses were instructed for every lineup, because the instructions were 
delivered by a laptop computer and each witness had to affirmatively indicate 
that they understood each element of the instructions before moving forward. 
And these instructions emphasized not only that the culprit might not be in the 
lineup but also that they do not have to make an identification. Nevertheless, 
the rate of filler identifications among those who made an identification 
(approximately 36%) in this field study is comparable to the average across all 
field studies (approximately 37%). 
II. EXISTING EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE EYEWITNESS-
IDENTIFICATION PROBLEM
As described in the previous section, there is a great deal of evidence 
from controlled scientific experiments, field studies of outcomes from police 
lineups, and DNA exonerations to make the case that eyewitness-identification 
evidence has not been handled well by the criminal justice system. At the same 
time, there has been a remarkable amount of progress in many jurisdictions, 
especially in the last 15 years, to make certain types of reforms to how 
eyewitness-identification evidence is collected, preserved, and used in court. 
These efforts to address the eyewitness-identification problem have operated 
at two levels, namely, policies implemented by administrative actions or 
legislative law on the one hand, and judicial rulings on the other hand. Policies 
implemented by administrative actions or legislative laws have been directed 
primarily at the procedures that are used by law enforcement for collecting 
eyewitness-identification evidence. In contrast, judicial rulings tend to revolve 
around questions of the admissibility of eyewitness-identification testimony, 
expert testimony by eyewitness experts, and so on. 
A. REFORMS TO THE COLLECTION AND PRESERVATION OF 
EYEWITNESS-IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE
Spurred in large part by media coverage of the continual unfolding of 
DNA exonerations, release of the Department of Justice guide on eyewitness 
evidence, concerted and effective work by the Innocence Project taking up 
eyewitness reform efforts, and partnerships between eyewitness researchers 
and policymakers, serious reforms in some jurisdictions began unfolding in 
28. See Wells, Steblay & Dysart, supra note 5. 
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2002. New Jersey, through the unique authority of Attorney General John 
Farmer, became the first state to set out a specific set of requirements for 
how law enforcement collects eyewitness-identification evidence. Working 
with eyewitness researchers and members of the New Jersey Department of 
Justice, the New Jersey procedures laid out a set of requirements about how 
eyewitnesses need to be instructed prior to a lineup (warning them that the 
culprit might not be present and that they need not identify anyone), how the 
lineup needs to be composed (at least five known-innocent fillers who also fit 
the eyewitness’s description of the culprit), the use of a lineup administrator 
who is uninvolved in the case and does not know which person is the suspect 
and which are fillers (a double-blind administration), and the collection of a 
statement of confidence from the witness at the time of identification (before 
the confidence statement can be contaminated by other events). Like most all 
of the reform documents adopted by jurisdictions that followed, violations of 
these procedures did not result in per se exclusion of the evidence. 
New Jersey is unique because it is the only state for which there is someone 
who has statutory authority over all law enforcement (i.e., New Jersey’s 
Attorney General). Hence, other jurisdictions could not follow the same model 
for effecting reforms to their eyewitness-identification procedures. Some 
states, such as North Carolina, used the legislative process to effect eyewitness-
identification reform. In addition, some jurisdictions have made reforms to 
eyewitness-identification procedures at the local (county) level. Early examples 
include places such as Suffolk County (Boston and surrounds), Massachusetts, 
and Santa Clara County, California. 
In general, jurisdictions that have made reforms to eyewitness-identification 
procedures from lineups have five basic elements:29 (1) only one suspect per 
lineup with at least five fillers, (2) the use of fillers who fit the eyewitness’s 
description of the suspect and do not let the suspect stand out in the lineup, 
(3) the use of double-blind administration, (4) pre-lineup instructions that the 
culprit might not be present, and (5) collection of a confidence statement from 
29. Some jurisdictions have also adopted the use of the sequential method for lineups rather 
than the traditional simultaneous method. With the sequential lineup method, eyewitnesses 
view one lineup member (or one photo) at a time and make an identification decision on that 
one before going on to the next lineup member (or photo). Also, with the sequential procedure 
the eyewitness does not know how many people (or photos) are in the sequence. There is debate 
among scientists about which procedure, simultaneous or sequential, is best. The National 
Research Council has concluded that the evidence is not conclusive one way or the other. See NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT: ASSESSING EYEWITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION (2014). Hence, whatever differences might exist between simultaneous and 
sequential procedures, those differences appear to be too small to make a strong case for one 
over the other. 
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the eyewitness at the time of the identification. Some jurisdictions require 
other things, such as videotaping of the entire identification procedure. And 
these reforms have spread fairly widely in recent years to include legislative 
law in the states of Florida, Ohio, Illinois, North Carolina, Maryland, Vermont, 
Kansas, Connecticut, and Colorado. In addition, some states have brought in 
laws requiring that all law enforcement agencies must have written policies on 
the collection of eyewitness evidence and have provided model policies (e.g., 
Texas, Wisconsin, West Virginia). These model policies tend to be versions of the 
same five eyewitness-identification procedures elements already mentioned. 
As mentioned earlier, probably the single most important reform is the use 
of double-blind lineup procedures. Recall that double-blind administration of 
lineups prevents three problems, namely: (1) lineup administrators steering 
witnesses toward their suspect, (2) lineup administrators giving feedback 
to witnesses that can influence their confidence statements, and (3) lineup 
administrators failing to faithfully make records of filler identifications. At the 
same time, many jurisdictions have argued that a double-blind requirement is 
impractical for many police departments. The poster child for this anti-double-
blind argument is the small police department that might have only two or five 
or seven officers. The argument for double-blind lineups being impractical for 
small police departments is that all their officers are likely to know who the 
suspect is and, hence, there is no one to be the double-blind administrator. 
Moreover, training a civilian employee (e.g., a dispatcher) who is not involved in 
investigations to administer lineups might not be wise because that person might 
have to provide testimony in court. But, there are two solutions to this problem 
of double-blind lineups in small departments. First, if the reforms occur at a 
statewide level (as in New Jersey, North Carolina, etc.), then it would be quite 
easy for a department to simply turn to a nearby jurisdiction and ask if they 
could send someone over to administer a lineup. Because the entire state is using 
the same procedures, no additional training is necessary for this “borrowed” 
officer. Neighboring police departments can have reciprocal arrangements. This 
is a highly manageable burden on a small police department because it would be 
quite rare that it would be needed. After all, a police department that is so small 
that it has only a handful of officers is one that will be doing an eyewitness-
identification task only on very rare occasions. Because most identifications are 
from photo lineups rather than live lineups, a second solution to the problem 
of not having a double-blind administrator is the use of the envelope-shuffle 
method. The envelope-shuffle method is one in which the lineup photos 
are each placed in their own envelope, the envelopes are shuffled before the 
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witness views them (one at a time), and the lineup administrator is shielded 
from knowing which photo the eyewitness is viewing. The use of the envelope 
method, however, makes it even more important that the entire procedure be 
videotaped to ensure that the lineup administrator did nothing to influence the 
eyewitness’s choice or the eyewitness’s confidence in that choice. 
B. EYEWITNESS-IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE IN COURT
Another level at which there has been some progress in the legal system’s 
treatment of eyewitness-identification evidence is in the courtroom. For 
example, almost every U.S. state now allows expert testimony on eyewitness 
identification at the discretion of the trial judge. On the other hand, with only 
a few exceptions, most states continue to model their rules on the admissibility 
of eyewitness-identification testimony based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1977 
decision in Manson v. Brathwaite.30 
Manson addresses the question of how lower courts should decide the 
admissibility of an identification when there is a claim that the state used 
suggestive methods to obtain the identification. After the Court’s ruling 
in Stovall v. Denno in 1967,31 some thought that unnecessarily suggestive 
procedures would result in automatic exclusion of identification testimony at 
trial following a due process inquiry. But Neil v. Biggers32 and Manson made 
it abundantly clear that unnecessarily suggestive procedures would result in 
exclusion only if the suggestion created substantial risk of misidentification. 
Hence, the Court fashioned a two-pronged test. In the first prong, the question 
to be answered is whether the identification procedure was unnecessarily 
suggestive. If not, then the identification testimony could be admitted. If it 
was unnecessarily suggestive, then the inquiry turns to the second prong. The 
second prong asks the question of whether the identification is reliable despite 
the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. For the second prong, the 
Court mentioned five questions to consider: Did the witness provide a good 
description of the culprit? How much time passed between the witnessing 
and the identification? Did the witness have a good opportunity to view the 
culprit? How carefully did the eyewitness pay attention to the culprit during 
the witnessed event? And, how certain is the witness in his or her identification? 
The Court did not intend for these five considerations (description, time 
passed, view, attention, and certainty) to be exhaustive. But, in practice, these 
tend to be the criteria used in the second prong.
30. 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
31. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
32. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
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The science that has developed around eyewitness identification has not 
been kind to the Manson approach to making determinations of the reliability 
of identification evidence that has been obtained under suggestive procedures. 
The scientific case against the Manson approach was summarized in a 2009 
article that has held some sway in state supreme courts (e.g., Oregon, New 
Jersey) as those courts have come to recognize flaws in Manson-like approaches. 
The main problem with the Manson approach is that it assumes that the 
reliability criteria are uninfluenced by the suggestive procedure itself. Research 
studies clearly show that suggestive procedures not only increase the risk of 
mistakenly identifying an innocent suspect, but these suggestive procedures 
also lead eyewitnesses to inflate their recollections of how good their view was, 
how closely they attended to the culprit’s face, and how confident (certain) 
they were when they made the identification. Hence, it has been described as 
somewhat ironic that the Manson factors of confidence, view, and attention 
“come into consideration by courts under precisely the circumstances in which 
they are least likely to be indicators of reliability due to their having been 
distorted [upward] by the suggestive procedure itself.”33 
Importantly, the majority opinion in Manson expressed the view that the 
two-pronged approach would effectively discourage the use of suggestive 
procedures. Because suggestive eyewitness-identification procedures inflate 
eyewitnesses’ standing on three of the five Manson criteria, however, it is 
little wonder that Manson hearings almost never result in the exclusion of 
eyewitness-identification testimony, even when the suggestiveness of the 
identification procedures is relatively extreme. In fact, an argument can and 
has been made that the Manson approach encourages the use of suggestive 
procedures because suggestive procedures not only help ensure that the witness 
will identify the suspect but also inflate the perceived credibility of the witness 
(high confidence, good view, close attention) while risking virtually no chance 
that the identification testimony will be excluded from trial. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has not revisited the question of how eyewitness-
identification evidence should be evaluated in the 40 years since Manson. 
In 2012, however, the Supreme Court did consider the question of whether 
a defendant has a right to a pretrial hearing on the reliability of suggestively 
 
 
 
33. Gary L. Wells & Deah S. Quinlivan, Suggestive Eyewitness Identification Procedures and 
the Supreme Court’s Reliability Test in Light of Eyewitness Science: 30 Years Later, 33 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 1, 17 (2009).
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obtained eyewitness-identification evidence if state actors did not create the 
suggestiveness.34 In that case, Perry v. New Hampshire, the Court ruled that 
there is no such constitutional right.  
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has been silent for 40 years on the question 
of how to assess the reliability of eyewitness identification when suggestive 
procedures were used to obtain an identification, some state courts have taken 
up the issue. Two prominent examples are the New Jersey Supreme Court 
in State v. Henderson35 and the Oregon Supreme Court in State v. Lawson.36 
The Henderson case is particularly interesting because, as noted earlier in this 
chapter, New Jersey was the first state to adopt statewide reforms in 2002 for 
how eyewitness-identification evidence is supposed to be collected. One of the 
requirements of the 2002 New Jersey eyewitness-identification procedures is 
that a photographic lineup must be conducted using a double-blind procedure. 
In other words, the case detectives cannot be present during an identification 
procedure. But the detectives violated that requirement and engaged in 
suggestive behaviors to secure an identification from the eyewitness. Like 
other states that have made reforms to eyewitness-identification procedures, 
violating the reform identification procedures in New Jersey does not result 
in per se exclusion of the identification evidence. In addition, at the time of 
Henderson, New Jersey followed the U.S. Supreme Court’s use of the Manson 
criteria. But the New Jersey Supreme Court knew that there were problems 
with Manson and, hence, appointed a special magistrate to hold hearings 
with eyewitness experts and provide the New Jersey Supreme Court with 
the findings. Eventually, the New Jersey Supreme Court made a ruling that 
replaced the two-prong Manson test. Under the new test, the court placed the 
initial burden of showing some evidence of suggestiveness on the defense and 
noted that this would usually be linked to a system variable. At that point, the 
burden would shift to the state to offer proof that the identification is reliable, 
accounting for system and estimator variables. If, after weighing the evidence 
and looking at the totality of the circumstances, there is a substantial likelihood 
of irreparable misidentification, then the court can suppress the identification. 
If the evidence is admitted despite the suggestiveness, then the court must 
provide an appropriate, tailored jury instruction.
Like Henderson, the Oregon Supreme Court’s ruling in Lawson changed the 
way the state’s lower courts approach eyewitness-identification evidence in 
criminal trials. Under Lawson’s framework, Oregon courts assess the reliability 
34. See Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228 (2012).
35. See State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208 (2011).
36. See State v. Lawson, 352 Or. 724 (2012).
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of eyewitness identifications under the Oregon Evidence Code (rather than 
Manson) and can provide remedies tailored to that concern. Additionally, the 
Oregon Supreme Court took judicial notice of an extensive body of research 
in the field and provided a non-exclusive list of considerations based on that 
research. In using the Oregon Evidence Code, the Oregon Supreme Court was 
able to go beyond mere constitutional considerations that have restricted the 
U.S. Supreme Court. 
III. THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL IMPROVEMENTS
There has been significant progress by many law enforcement agencies and 
courtrooms on improving the collection, preservation, and use of eyewitness-
identification evidence. Nevertheless, a large proportion of law enforcement 
agencies in the U.S. have not made significant reforms and most courts in the 
U.S. still use some version of the Manson approach to dealing with eyewitness-
identification evidence. 
Moreover, even jurisdictions that have adopted a basic reform package for 
how to conduct lineups have generally fallen well short of additional steps 
that can and ought to be taken. For example, very few jurisdictions require 
that the identification procedure be videotaped. As few as 10 years ago, this 
might have been an unreasonable request. Today, however, almost everyone 
has a video recorder in their pocket, and video-storage costs are nearly zero. 
Also, many jurisdictions that want to claim that they have made reforms have 
resisted the important requirement that eyewitnesses be asked about their 
confidence immediately following any identification. And yet, the scientific 
evidence is clearer than ever that the only confidence statement that can be 
trusted for purposes of evaluating the likely accuracy of the identification is 
the confidence of the eyewitness at the time of the identification. Moreover, 
few police jurisdictions have concerned themselves with the prevalent use of 
showups. A showup is an identification procedure in which there are no fillers 
and instead the police present an eyewitness with only one person. Research has 
revealed that showups are the most dangerous of all identification procedures 
because, unlike a lineup, there are no known-innocent fillers to siphon mistaken 
identifications away from an innocent suspect.37 Police agencies that have made 
eyewitness-identification reforms have dealt almost exclusively with the lineup. 
However, policies and procedures on showups (when they are necessary and 
 
 
37. Andrew M. Smith et al., Fair Lineups Are Better Than Biased Lineups and Showups, but Not 
Because They Increase Underlying Discriminability, 41 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 127 (2016).
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when they can be avoided, how to reduce the suggestiveness of the showup, and 
so on) need to be a part of the reform packages that law enforcement agencies 
consider as well.
Another problem that the legal system has not addressed at all thus far is 
the “base rate” problem. Recall that the base-rate problem concerns the fact 
that there is no requirement that there be reasonable suspicion before putting 
a person in a lineup to see if the eyewitness will identify that person. Without 
any standard for deciding when to conduct an identification procedure, some 
jurisdictions could be running a high proportion of mistaken identifications 
purely because they run a large number of culprit-absent identification 
procedures. This base-rate problem is well known in diagnostic medicine 
and the problem is paralleled in eyewitness identification. When a medical 
diagnostic test is performed on individuals for whom there is little reason to 
suspect have a particular disease, the rate of false positives can be quite high. 
This is why, for example, prostate screening is not recommended for men 
under the age of 30. Although the prostate test itself is just as accurate for men 
under 30 as it is for men over 50, the base rate for prostate cancer for men 
under the age of 30 is so low that almost all positive test results are actually false 
positives. This same phenomenon occurs if the base rate for the guilty person 
being in lineups is low, namely a high percentage of identifications will be of 
innocent people. But, whereas the public health system has embraced the base-
rate problem and regularly issues guidelines for when diagnostic tests (e.g., 
breast scans, pap smears, PSA) are inappropriate, the legal system has no rules, 
guidelines, or warnings about using an identification procedure in the absence 
of reasonable suspicion that the subject of that lineup is the culprit. Given the 
false-identification rate for culprit-absent lineups in controlled experiments 
and the rate at which eyewitnesses identify known-innocent fillers in lineups, 
there can be no doubt that eyewitness-identification procedures have inherent 
jeopardy for an innocent suspect. Hence, the question of whether there should 
be some reasonable suspicion that a person is the culprit in question before 
placing that person in jeopardy of an identification procedure should perhaps 
be part of a national conversation. 
RECOMMENDATIONS
Crime investigators and courts need to begin treating eyewitness-
identification evidence more like a form of trace evidence. Like physical trace 
evidence, eyewitness evidence needs to be collected and preserved using careful 
protocols, and investigators need to be carefully trained in how to carry out 
those protocols so as to maximize the probative value of the evidence.
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1. Every law enforcement agency should have written policies and training 
on how to conduct eyewitness-identification procedures. There are 
model procedures based on the science and on best practices that law 
enforcement agencies can adopt. Minimal standards should include 
double-blind lineup administration, carefully selected lineup fillers so 
that the suspect does not stand out, pre-lineup instructions warning the 
eyewitness that the culprit might not be in the lineup, and the immediate 
collection of a confidence statement from any witness who makes an 
identification.
2. Courts need to play a stronger role in incentivizing law enforcement 
to use eyewitness-identification procedures that are less suggestive by 
imposing costs (e.g., jury instructions, admission of experts, and in some 
cases exclusion of testimony) when suggestive procedures are used.
3. Crime investigators should be cautious about placing an individual 
into the inherent jeopardy of a lineup procedure if there is not some 
evidence-based reasonable suspicion.
CONCLUSION
A great deal is known about how to make improvements in the collection, 
preservation, and use of eyewitness-identification evidence. And improvements 
have clearly been made in recent years. Nevertheless, a large proportion of 
U.S. law enforcement agencies have not made significant reforms to their 
eyewitness-identification procedures. Similarly, most U.S. courts continue 
to make judgments about the reliability and admissibility of eyewitness-
identification evidence based on a problematic version of an approach that was 
put forward by the U.S. Supreme Court 40 years ago. In general, the U.S. legal 
system needs to handle eyewitness evidence as if it were like other forms of trace 
evidence. Like other forms of trace evidence (e.g., hair, fibers, fingerprints), in 
the case of eyewitness evidence the culprit left behind a trace (memory trace) 
that can help establish the identity of the culprit. And, like other forms of trace 
evidence, memory traces can be fragile, deteriorate, are easily contaminated, 
and need to be collected and preserved using scientifically validated protocols.
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